Author: Cybersecurity Expert Julie Baker

Electronic voting—using computers to cast, count, and manage votes—sounds futuristic and efficient. But it’s a terrible idea, riddled with flaws that undermine the integrity of elections. From complexity to vulnerability, the risks are overwhelming. Let’s break down why electronic voting, in all its forms, fails to deliver secure and trustworthy elections, and why alternatives like blockchain and mobile voting don’t solve the problem.

The Core Problems with Electronic Voting

Complexity: The Enemy of Security

In cybersecurity, complexity is a death knell for security. The more intricate a system, the harder it is to secure. Modern electronic voting systems are a labyrinth of components—hardware, software, and networks—each a potential attack vector.

Consider this: today’s voting machines rely on millions of lines of code—3 to 4 million, to be precise—just to count votes. That’s absurd. Any developer will tell you that counting votes shouldn’t require such bloated software. Analyzing this much code for vulnerabilities is a Herculean task, taking years. And with every update, the process starts over. It’s almost as if the systems are designed to evade scrutiny, cloaked in unnecessary complexity.

Centralization: Loss of Local Control

Centralized voting systems strip away local control, handing power to distant entities. Federal involvement in elections—through agencies like CISA, ISACs, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), and laws like HAVA—introduces risks. Tools like Albert sensors and the Center for Internet Security further erode local oversight. Even at the state level, centralization is a problem. South Carolina, for example, runs a fully centralized voting system from Columbia. When control is concentrated, voters lose their grip on the process. Can centralized control ever be trusted in elections?

Outsourced: Who’s Really in Charge?

Our elections are largely outsourced to private companies like ES&S, Dominion, and Hart InterCivic, many of which are owned by private equity firms. This raises serious questions about transparency. Who are the investors? What’s their security posture? We don’t know, because these companies operate in the shadows, often relying on other third parties—some not even based in the U.S. With so much of the process outsourced, local control is a myth.

Opaque: Black Boxes We Can’t Trust

Electronic voting systems are black boxes. The source code is proprietary, not open-source, so no one outside the companies can inspect it. You can’t pop open the machines to check the hardware either. Is there a cellular modem inside? No way to know. Cast Vote Records (CVRs) and audit logs are often inaccessible, and private companies aren’t subject to FOIA requests. Without transparency or the ability to audit, how can we trust the results?

Vulnerable: A Hacker’s Playground

Software is inherently vulnerable. Developers make mistakes, and those mistakes become exploitable weaknesses. Every update introduces new vulnerabilities. Even air-gapped systems—those supposedly isolated from networks—can be compromised via infected USB drives. No electronic system can ever be 100% secure. Bad actors can manipulate software in real time, leaving no trace. The risks are not theoretical; they’re inevitable.

Can Blockchain Save the Day?

Blockchain—a decentralized, transparent, and immutable digital ledger—sounds like a dream solution for elections. It’s used for cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, as well as real estate and financial transactions. Its appeal for voting is obvious: a secure, tamper-resistant system with no central authority. But is it really the answer?

The Blockchain Mirage

Blockchain isn’t a silver bullet. It’s not just the ledger; it’s the entire ecosystem—software, hardware, third-party integrations, and cryptographic key management—that introduces complexity. And complexity, as we’ve established, breeds insecurity. Blockchain systems can be public, private, or hybrid, permissioned or permissionless, centralized or decentralized. The devil’s in the implementation.

Real-world attacks on blockchain systems prove their vulnerability. Hackers have targeted wallets, cryptographic keys, consensus mechanisms (like 51% attacks), networking protocols (Sybil, Eclipse, DDoS), APIs, decentralized apps, exchanges, smart contracts, and even the foundational blockchain software. Losses have reached billions. Where there’s value—whether money or votes—attackers will follow. Nation-states, too, have a vested interest in controlling or disrupting elections. A truly decentralized, transparent blockchain for voting? Don’t hold your breath—governments like centralized control, as seen in Romania’s 2020 and 2024 elections, which used the EU’s centrally controlled blockchain.

Mobile Voting: A Disaster in the Making

Mobile voting—casting ballots via smartphone—sounds convenient, but it’s a nightmare. A group funded by Tusk Philanthropies is developing a mobile voting system, potentially for use in upcoming midterms. Here’s why it’s a terrible idea:

• Partisan Roots: Despite claims of non-partisanship, the developers lean left, raising concerns about bias.
• No Security Gains: The system aims to be “as secure” as current voting systems—which, as we’ve seen, are far from secure.
• Shady Ties: The cryptography has links to the NSA, DARPA, and Microsoft, and foreign third parties, like a Danish company, are involved in development.
• Complexity Overload: It’s as complex as, if not more than, existing systems, with all the same vulnerabilities.
• Weak Authentication: Relying on SMS or facial recognition opens the door to fraud via synthetic identities and cell phone farms.
• Mail-in Voting 2.0: The system is pitched as a replacement for mail-in voting, which President Trump has criticized. It’s essentially mail-in voting on steroids, amplifying the risks of fraud.

The claim that voters can track their ballots “all the way through” falls apart when ballots are transferred to an “air-gapped” system for printing and tallying, breaking the chain of transparency.

The Bottom Line: Electronic Voting is Irredeemable

Whether it’s current systems, blockchain, or mobile voting, electronic voting is plagued by the same issues:

• Complexity: All these systems are overly complex, creating countless attack surfaces.
• Centralization: Implementation matters, but nation-states and private entities prefer control over transparency.
• Opacity: Lack of access to code, hardware, or audit logs undermines trust.
• Vulnerability: Software and hardware are inherently flawed, and attackers exploit those flaws.
• Outsourcing: Private companies, often with opaque ownership, control the process, eroding local oversight.

With the rise of AI and quantum computing, these vulnerabilities will only grow. Banks set aside millions for fraud and buy cyber insurance because breaches are inevitable. But elections aren’t like banks—you can’t tolerate any fraud. You get one shot, and the system must be 100% secure. That’s impossible with electronic voting.

The Solution: Back to Basics

Electronic voting, in all its forms, enables cheating at scale. Blockchain and mobile voting are shiny distractions, but they’re just as flawed as current systems. The only way to ensure secure, transparent, and trustworthy elections is to return to paper. Hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots are simple, auditable, and resistant to large-scale fraud.

Say no to blockchain voting. Say no to mobile voting. Say yes to paper. It’s not glamorous, but it’s the only way to protect our elections.

Are you tired of waiting in long lines on Election Day? In South Carolina, the root cause may be precincts that are too large. State law (Section 7-7-710) mandates that precincts with over 1,500 registered voters must be resized, yet 40% of precincts—approximately 925 out of 2,317 across 46 counties—exceed this limit (and 40% of counties are non-compliant). Some, like Longcreek in Richland County, with a staggering 6,238 voters, have violated this law for years. This widespread non-compliance undermines election integrity, causes voter frustration, and risks disenfranchisement.

The Scope of the Problem

Counties like Greenville (78.8% non-compliant), Horry (63.5%), Spartanburg (60.2%), Lexington (59.4%), and York (59%) lead the state in oversized precincts. Shockingly, 15 precincts have over 5,000 voters, and 39 exceed 4,000. For example, precincts like Fort Mill No. 2 in York County (5,523 voters) and Johns Island 2 in Charleston County (6,040 voters) far surpass the legal limit, creating overcrowded polling stations and long wait times.

From 2021 to 2024, only about 15 precincts significantly reduced their size to approach the 1,500-voter mandate. Alarmingly, 30% of non-compliant precincts increased in size during this period. Here are just a few examples that illustrate this trend:

Voter Counts in Select South Carolina Precincts (2021–2024)

County	Precinct	2021	2022	2024
Lancaster	Black Horse Run	4,539	4,699	5,179
Horry	Socastee #3	4,300	4,323	5,132
Richland	Pontiac 2	2,761	3,075	4,328
Berkeley	Cane Bay	3,135	3,389	4,042
Greenville	Ranch Creek	2,940	3,001	4,033

Data sourced from voter rolls, reflecting changes in registered voters from 2021 to 2024.

Even precincts that reduced their size between election years remain well above the legal threshold, highlighting a systemic failure to comply with the law.

Why It Matters

Oversized precincts create:

• Long wait times: Crowded polling stations discourage voters, particularly seniors and those with limited time.
• Voter suppression: Long lines and logistical challenges can reduce turnout, undermining fair elections.
• Barriers to hand-counting: Our group advocates for hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots at the precinct level to eliminate the fraud-prone electronic voting system and centralized counting. Oversized precincts make this process impractical, risking delays that could extend past midnight.

The State Election Commission (SEC) and General Assembly have failed to enforce Section 7-7-710, often issuing waivers that prioritize administrative convenience over voter rights. Early voting and voting centers, sometimes used to justify oversized precincts, increase fraud risks due to the comingling of ballots, among other things, and should be eliminated. Non-compliance not only defies the law but also erodes voter access and local control over elections.

A Pattern of Neglect

Analysis of voter rolls from 2021 to 2024 suggests an intentional trend of maintaining or even increasing precinct sizes. The SC Election Commission and General Assembly have allowed counties to flout the law, with no clear accountability. For instance, one analyst manually redrew one of the worst-offending precincts (Mt Pleasant 35) using the GIS Map, road names, and precinct names to query the database (Post 2024 General) and determine the roads for each division of the precinct. Without using the GIS software, it took her 90 minutes, and she estimated that all of the precincts over 3,000 would take 15 days for one person to complete, proving that compliance is not tricky, but feasible, easy, and straightforward. So why hasn’t it been done? It could undoubtedly be done far more quickly with GIS computer software.

President Trump seems poised to eliminate mail-in ballots and machines, which would portend that we will be hand-counting, hand-marked ballots. To make this happen, we must keep precincts under 1500.

With President Trump calling for action to eliminate electronics in our election system, the time has come to reduce precinct size to ensure hand-counting is feasible.

The Path Forward

Enforcing Section 7-7-710 is critical to restoring fair, transparent, and community-driven elections. Smaller precincts would:

• Reduce wait times and improve voter access.
• Enable secure, hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day.
• Eliminate fraud-prone voting centers and ensure decentralized elections.

South Carolina’s leaders must act now to:

1. Redraw precincts: Use GIS mapping to resize precincts to meet the 1,500-voter limit.
2. End waivers: Stop excusing non-compliance and hold counties accountable.
3. Prioritize voters: Focus on accessibility and integrity, not administrative convenience.

The people’s voice—not county administrators’ preferences—must guide our elections. Demand action from the SEC and General Assembly to enforce the law and ensure every South Carolinian’s vote is counted fairly and efficiently.

The table below is data based on voter rolls as of 11/10/2024, post-2024 General Election. Note: 2 precincts with one voter and no name were excluded from the 2,319 total precincts analyzed. We included a buffer of 10% or 1650 and flagged any precincts exceeding that number.

Data is based on a database purchased on 11/10/24, just after the 2024 General Election. These numbers would be higher if you used the strict 1,500 legal limit.

On May 31st, over 100 grassroots activists and election experts gathered in Dallas, Texas, to demonstrate several hand-count methods for ballots. We collaborated with multiple state leaders and educated many interested parties on the Gold Standard for elections, which is our recommended approach for re-engineering the four phases of our election ecosystem from registration to reporting. All attendees had a lot of fun. Here is a short highlight reel of the event.

We were able to demonstrate our favored method, which we have fine-tuned over the last two years. This method is simple, easy, and straightforward to train. Our recommendation is for a second poll worker crew to come in after the polls close to count. These workers can be identified and trained by the parties and election officials, but should be recruited from the general public. Another option is to create a system similar to the jury selection system. In recent trainings conducted with young and old citizens, we had minimal, if any, errors after a quick 15-minute training.

The method is very secure and can be double-checked and verified by scanning the batch of ballots before the count, and or recording with a phone or iPad. To count by midnight, we recommend that precincts be kept to a maximum of 1500. The biggest general elections would result in approximately 1,000 ballots based on turnout. This would require 3-4 teams of 4 to count per precinct, and they could easily finish in no more than 4 hours.

Here is a quick video of our Gold Standard Tally method:

For more information about the Gold Standard Method and our proposed executive order for elections that was sent to the Trump administration, go to these links:

Gold Standard Elections

The People’s Executive Order for Elections