Weak standards breed a lack of trust in our voting systems Interview with Clay Parikh

In this engaging discussion Clay Parikh, who worked for 9 years in the Vote System Test Labs joins local South Carolina cyber experts to discuss the weak standards and rubber stamp certification of the electronic voting systems. The VVSG Voluntary Voting System Guidelines are also lacking. The security requirements are general and vague and the test results are normally approved regardless of test outcomes. WE are still testing to 2005 standards which were weak to begin with.

The group discuss the possibility of moving to a hand-marked hand-counted ballot system. Clay suggests that counties should have more flexibility to test different systems.

***********The computer system SC uses reads a barcode on the ballot/receipt the voter prints out and sometimes that can’t be interpreted by a bar code reader due to low dpi resolution. This leads us to question whether our tabulators let alone the voter can verify their vote.****************

We also talked specifically about the systems used in South Carolina for the 2020 and the 2022 elections (EVS 6.0.2.0 and EVS 6.1.1.0). Once a system is certified it is done until there are material changes, Thus, most of the changes regardless of their complexity are labeled as “de minimis.” The EAC willingly “buys off on this.” The EAC also gave retroactive certification post 2020 to expired VSTL lab certifications because……COVID. Why couldn’t they say that proactively? The EAC appears to cover for the labs and there is the appearance of an incestuous relationship. The progression to federalization of the elections is also a concern. For example, why are Albert sensors continuously monitoring our election machines?

Risk assessment is key here. Why aren’t the risks being properly addressed for such an important system?

There are weak standards for testing; weak tests, weak to nonexistent configuration management, and outdated software. This is a must watch if you want to know more about the security of the systems you vote on. Do you trust that your vote counted? Would you put your money in a bank with this weak of a security system with a lack of robust testing? We think not. Our vote is a form of currency too.